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NO. 33 JUNE 2020 Introduction 
A Corona Presidency in the 
Coronavirus Crisis? 
The Dual Task of the German Presidency: Containing the Crisis and Giving a 
Lasting Impetus to European Solidarity and Autonomy 
Eckhard Lübkemeier and Nicolai von Ondarza 
According to the dictionary, a “corona” is the bright circle of light around the sun 
during a total eclipse. While the darkness of the corona pandemic is not total, the 
death toll and economic consequences that have come with it are devastating. This 
puts the EU “to the greatest test” in its history, according to Chancellor Angela 
Merkel. Against this backdrop, Germany will take over the EU Council presidency on 
1 July 2020 – caught between high expectations on the one hand, and the diminished 
influence of a presidency on the other. The task of the German presidency is twofold: 
Contain the negative fallout from the crisis and use its integrative momentum for 
the revitalisation of a crisis-prone European Union. Ultimately, EU members can only 
achieve this together, but the German presidency can contribute a great deal by forg-
ing compromises, providing incentives, and orienting itself towards the model of a 
solidarity-based and autonomous Europe – even beyond the Council presidency. 
 
Once again Germany is taking over the EU 
Council presidency during a crisis. In 2007, 
after the Dutch and French had rejected 
the Constitutional Treaty, the last German 
presidency managed to put the integration 
process back on track, brokering a com-
promise that led to what eventually became 
the Lisbon Treaty. This time, however, the 
challenge is even greater. 
Since 2007 the EU has been in crisis 
mode for most of the time: the financial 
and economic crisis that erupted in 2008 
and stretched the Eurozone to the breaking 
point; the refugee crisis from 2015; Brexit 
and the emergence of anti-European popu-
lism coupled with a disregard for the con-
stitutive principle of rule of law by some 
member states – a succession of shocks 
that has prevented the lasting stabilisation 
of the EU (on the EU’s enduring crises, see 
SWP-Studie 6/2019). 
An unstable EU is now confronted with 
a corona pandemic that has claimed hun-
dreds of thousands of lives and, according to 
the International Monetary Fund, is likely 
to result in the worst recession of the world 
economy since the 1930s. In Europe, too, 
more than a hundred thousand people have 
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fallen victim to the pandemic, and the eco-
nomic downturn will be the severest in EU 
history. 
More Than Just a Crisis Presidency 
In this critical phase, Germany assumes 
leadership responsibility through the Coun-
cil presidency. The pandemic is accelerating 
international upheavals and trends that 
were already in effect before the outbreak, 
such as the erosion of multilateral institu-
tions and rules as well as de-globalisation. 
While the pandemic relentlessly exposes 
the vulnerabilities of global trade and sup-
ply chains, it also shows that borders do not 
provide immunity. This is true for climate 
change as well, and there is no reliable pro-
tection from migratory pressures either. 
Nor should it be sought, as global exchange 
and division of labour can promote pros-
perity and development for all. That is why 
multilateral cooperation beyond pandemic 
control is indispensable for the EU. 
However, the omens are not favourable: 
Donald Trump’s America sees international 
rules and regimes as constraining rather 
than enhancing American power, China 
is becoming increasingly autocratic, and 
a bitter rivalry between the two countries 
could shape the 21st century. These three 
factors – enduring EU crises, pandemic 
devastation, world disorder – form the 
background to the German presidency. 
Thus, Germany is looking forward to a 
Council presidency under unprecedented 
circumstances. The high expectations being 
placed in the German presidency are fur-
ther enhanced by Germany’s economic 
clout, which has, at least in relative terms, 
grown due to the corona crisis: Of the larger 
EU states, Germany has the best prospects 
for a recovery because it has managed the 
pandemic comparatively well. In addition, 
thanks to its economic strength and solid 
finances, it can afford government aid and 
economic stimulus packages on a scale 
hardly matched by any other EU country. 
This gives rise to two overarching guide-
lines for the Council presidency: Germany 
can only recover from the pandemic in a 
sustainable manner if its EU neighbours 
recover as well; and only a stronger Europe 
can be an equal partner for global powers 
such as the US and China, as well as non-
state actors such as Google, Amazon, and 
others. 
The second guideline for Berlin is to 
handle its strength with care. To do so, the 
ambivalence about Germany’s strength 
must be taken into account: An EU faced 
with an unprecedented stress test requires 
a Council presidency with clout and the 
willingness to use it, but Germany should 
not be perceived as overpowering. To this 
end, it is important not to sideline EU leader-
ship figures, such as the presidents of the 
European Council, Commission, and Par-
liament. Thus, the German presidency will 
have to display empathy and sensitivity in 
exercising leadership. The most powerful 
resource uniting Europe is mutual trust 
and the common recognition that collective 
European power complements and reinforces 
national identity and national interests. 
This resource, which has already been 
heavily strained in the course of Europe’s 
ongoing crises, was severely tested at the 
beginning of the corona pandemic: “When 
Europe really needed to be there for each 
other, too many initially looked out for 
themselves,” remarked Commission Presi-
dent Ursula von der Leyen on 26 March 
2020. This will not be forgotten soon, even 
if European community spirit now prevails. 
Revitalising this sentiment of togetherness 
is the overarching challenge of the German 
Council presidency. 
A Diminished Presidency 
A realistic assessment of the prospects for 
the German presidency must take into 
account that the scope of the EU presidency 
has diminished over time. First, to state 
the obvious, within the EU institutions the 
presidency is limited to the Council, and 
even there it can only mediate and propose; 
decisions require agreement from the other 
member states. 
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A successful presidency is characterised 
above all by acting as an “honest broker” 
and facilitating compromises: among mem-
bers of the European Council and in the EU 
legislative process together with the Coun-
cil, Parliament, and Commission. Fulfilling 
this role is often easier for smaller member 
states, as they have less power and therefore 
draw less suspicion about using their presi-
dencies for advancing national objectives. 
Larger states, on the other hand, are often 
exposed to both higher expectations and 
greater conflicts between their national 
self-interests and the overall European in-
terest – as in the budget negotiations, 
which will be the focus of attention during 
the German EU presidency. 
Secondly, the Lisbon Treaty has signifi-
cantly changed the character of the presi-
dency. Since then, the most important 
bodies in the Council have been led by their 
own permanent presidencies – the Euro-
pean Council, where the EU’s political 
guidelines are negotiated (Charles Michel), 
the Foreign Affairs Council (High Repre-
sentative Josep Borrell), the Eurogroup (still 
Mário Centeno), and all Council working 
groups linked to the Euro Area and the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy. In 
the most important forum, the European 
Council, Chancellor Merkel will thus be an 
ordinary participant during the German 
presidency, to the extent that the represen-
tative of the largest EU member state is an 
ordinary participant like all the others. As 
a result, most Council presidencies since 
Lisbon have been rather inconspicuous and 
have, if at all, excelled as “service provid-
ers” in effectively managing Council busi-
ness. The events most visible and effective 
in terms of publicity have been summit 
meetings, usually held once per presidency 
in the relevant EU member state. 
Thirdly, the agenda of a presidency is 
considerably pre-determined by the EU’s 
long-term legislative planning, thus limit-
ing its own scope for action. Six months 
are seldom sufficient to negotiate legislative 
projects at the European level from the 
beginning to the final decision. The Ger-
man presidency is beginning only six 
months after the von der Leyen Commis-
sion took office. In an EU legislative period, 
this is traditionally the time when the Com-
mission presents its first major legislative 
initiatives – for the German presidency, 
these would be, in particular, the initiatives 
of the European Green Deal and the digital 
strategy. 
The pandemic has also imposed severe 
logistical restrictions. The EU “compromise 
machine” runs primarily on a large number 
of formal and informal meetings. In the 
second half of 2019, for example, the Finn-
ish presidency of the Council held 52 Coun-
cil meetings and 52 meetings in the Com-
mittee of Permanent Representatives of the 
Governments of the Member States (Core-
per), 1,164 meetings of Council working 
groups, and 131 meetings in Finland. In 
addition, there are the many preparatory 
meetings that a presidency holds to nego-
tiate compromises. One of the presidency’s 
most important tasks nowadays is coordi-
nation with the EU Parliament and the 
Commission in the so-called trialogues to 
negotiate EU legislation in detail between 
the institutions. There were a total of 74 
such trialogues under the Finnish presidency. 
For the second half of 2020, however, repre-
sentatives of the federal government expect 
that only 30 per cent of the regular work 
of the Council can take place, which will 
invariably limit the work that can get done 
during the German presidency. 
Last but not least, it is the responsibility 
of the presidency to react to external crises. 
Quite a few presidencies have been con-
fronted with crises that have pushed aside 
large parts of their agendas. Almost all of 
the agenda of the Croatian presidency dur-
ing the first half of 2020 was superseded 
by the extraordinary circumstances of the 
pandemic and the coordination of the EU’s 
crisis response. In view of the uncertain 
course of the pandemic – including its eco-
nomic and social as well as foreign and 
security policy implications – and the out-
come of the US presidential election, the 
German presidency will have to continually 
adapt its agenda and the work of the 
Council. 
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A (Too) Ambitious Agenda  
Under these circumstances, the German 
Council presidency had to reorganise its 
programme in light of three potentially 
conflicting factors: high expectations, a 
limited role of the presidency, and the chal-
lenging effects of the pandemic. As a result, 
the presidency agenda now has three prior-
ities. 
Priority 1: Corona, its 
consequences – and the EU budget 
The most important task will be to facilitate 
agreement on the EU’s response to the pan-
demic and its multiple consequences. As 
Germany prepares to begin the presidency, 
the number of infections in EU states has 
fallen and restrictions on public life are 
gradually being lifted in the majority of 
states. However, the pace of relaxation, the 
reopening of borders, and infection rates 
will vary among member states. Even with-
out a second wave of infections, substantial 
energy and attention will be required for 
coordinating national and European-level 
measures as far as possible. 
At the same time, centrifugal forces have 
to be contained. The corona pandemic is 
a symmetrical shock with asymmetrical 
effects: It will hit southern EU states harder 
economically than northern and central/ 
eastern European states. Even Greece, 
which has managed to keep infection rates 
relatively low, is likely to suffer heavily due 
to the economic importance of its tourism 
sector. In addition, the leeway for budget-
ary stimuli differs widely among member 
states. Countries such as Germany have 
been able to launch extensive economic 
stimulus packages. Such disparities could 
also endanger the level playing field of 
the internal market. 
In response to the disparities, France and 
Germany have proposed an EU recovery 
fund, which the EU Commission has now 
included in its proposal for the Multiannual 
Financial Framework (MFF) 2021–2027 – 
with €500 billion in grants and €250 billion 
in loans. Although EU member states agree 
in principle that such a recovery fund is 
necessary, key issues such as the volume 
of the fund, the ratio of grants and loans, 
and control of the use of funds are to be 
negotiated during the German presidency. 
If member states reach agreement on the 
basic elements of the recovery fund, it 
would entail a significant deepening of 
European integration. 
Closely linked to this is the finalising 
of the MFF – the EU’s regular seven-year 
budget – for the period 2021–2027. Even 
under normal circumstances, MFF negotia-
tions are among the most difficult in the 
EU: Member states have to decide unani-
mously about financial allocations, and 
thus political priorities, while also negotiat-
ing which states are to benefit most from 
the EU budget and which are to contribute 
the most as net contributors. In this regard, 
too, close coordination with EU institutions 
is necessary – the proposal for the MFF 
is presented by the Commission, and the 
delicate negotiations between the member 
states are conducted at the highest level in 
the European Council and chaired by Coun-
cil President Michel. The German presiden-
cy will be primarily responsible for facili-
tating a compromise within the European 
Council and for reaching an agreement 
with the European Parliament. 
This will require a great deal of coordina-
tion, and the stakes are high: The success 
or failure of the German presidency will be 
largely determined by the outcome of the 
negotiations on the MFF and the recovery 
fund. 
Priority 2: Brexit and other time-
critical dossiers 
Second-order priorities are those processes 
that need to be completed by the end of 
2020 due to legal deadlines – despite logis-
tical constraints caused by the pandemic. 
These include not only the MFF, which must 
be adopted early in the second half of 2020 
so that EU funds can be disbursed at the 
beginning of 2021, but also, for example, 
the annual fishing quotas and the regular 
2021 budget. 
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A significant legal deadline is 31 Decem-
ber 2020, which is the end of the Brexit 
transition period, after which the UK will 
no longer apply EU law, thus leaving the 
EU single market and Customs Union and 
ceasing to participate in all other EU poli-
cies. By then, the agreement(s) on the future 
relationship between the EU and the UK 
should be in force, otherwise there is a risk 
of a “no trade deal” Brexit, including the 
reintroduction of border controls and cus-
toms duties. It is not only because of the 
pandemic that talks have gone nowhere so 
far, pointing towards another conflict-laden 
autumn with tough EU-UK negotiations. 
On Brexit, the German presidency has 
only a limited role to play – the negotia-
tions are conducted by the EU Commission, 
coordination among the EU-27 is delegated 
to a separate working group in the Council 
under permanent leadership, and the rele-
vant body at the political level is the Euro-
pean Council. Thus, separate initiatives by 
the German presidency or bilateral German-
British negotiations on Brexit would be 
counterproductive. In practice, the presi-
dency’s role will be to support EU negotia-
tors and preserve the unity of the EU-27, 
though Brexit is likely to dominate Euro-
pean politics again in the autumn. 
Priority 3: Any other business 
Containing the pandemic and reaching an 
agreement on a recovery fund, as well as 
MFF and Brexit negotiations, present formi-
dable challenges in themselves. In addition, 
legislative dossiers not finalised during the 
Croatian presidency will have to be taken 
up again, and the Council’s work will con-
tinue to be logistically limited due to the 
pandemic. There will thus be only limited 
time and political attention left for any-
thing other than obligatory projects. 
Politically, Berlin’s presidency comes at 
the beginning of the von der Leyen Com-
mission. Thus, the presidency would be 
called upon to take forward the first major 
initiatives of the new Commission, both in 
the European Council and in the trialogues 
with the European Parliament and the 
Commission. Key projects are, for example, 
legislative initiatives on the European 
Green Deal, EU regulation on artificial in-
telligence, the expansion of the digital 
internal market, and the draft law to com-
bat tax evasion in Europe. 
The Green Deal is a case in point on the 
pandemic’s impact on other issues. Although 
still part of the presidency’s agenda, the 
debate on the Green Deal now focuses on 
the importance that climate policy should 
be accorded in the recovery programmes. 
In view of the immense economic damage 
caused by the pandemic, critics are warning 
against imposing further restrictions on 
European industry at present. Proponents 
argue that climate protection cannot wait, 
and that the recovery fund should be used 
to drive the transformation of the European 
economy towards climate neutrality. This 
will put Germany’s negotiating skills to the 
test, in particular because the Just Transi-
tion Fund for member states that are more 
affected by the energy transformation might 
be lower than envisaged before the pan-
demic struck. However, as Europe’s indus-
trial powerhouse, Germany has particular 
powers of persuasion that it can deploy to 
push for the Green Deal. 
The protection of democracy and the rule 
of law will be sensitive issues for the Ger-
man presidency in two respects. On the one 
hand, the Commission intends to make 
proposals on how to strengthen the rule of 
law in member states. For another, the next 
report on the state of the rule of law is due 
in the second half of 2020. A focus will be 
on Poland and Hungary, against which pro-
ceedings for breaches of the rule of law are 
underway. The situation has worsened due 
to the pandemic, as some EU member states 
have decided to restrict fundamental rights 
and public life in order to contain the 
spread of the coronavirus. Such measures 
have to be rescinded once the acute phase 
of the pandemic is over. The challenge 
facing the German presidency will be to 
combine the protection of the fundamental 
rule of law principle with the negotiations 
on the next budget and the recovery fund. 
In addition, the conclusion of a new “pact 
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for asylum and migration” is an ambition 
of Berlin. However, it is unlikely to come 
to fruition during Germany’s presidency 
because member states remain deadlocked, 
especially on the question of the distribu-
tion of refugees (see SWP Comment 
28/2020). 
The pandemic has also affected the presi-
dency’s foreign policy agenda. Prior to 
the outbreak, the German government had 
set its sights on EU relations with China as 
a major topic. Meanwhile, the associated 
summit has been postponed until an un-
specified date. A summit meeting between 
the EU and the African Union is still sched-
uled to take place. The second half of 2020 
will also see presidential elections in the 
US, after which EU member states will have 
to decide on what to make of the outcome 
and how to deal with the winner – a politi-
cally sensitive issue regardless of who wins. 
In addition, there are likely to be unexpected 
events and challenges in the EU’s southern 
neighbourhood and beyond that demand 
an EU response. Thus, the presidency 
would be well advised to strongly support 
the efforts of the EU High Representative of 
the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security 
Policy, Josep Borrell. 
Three Guiding Principles 
for the Presidency 
“Never let a serious crisis go to waste”: 
This warning – employed in 2009 by Rahm 
Emanuel, US President Barack Obama’s 
chief of staff, during the financial and eco-
nomic crisis – is even more valid today. The 
economic slump resulting from the corona 
pandemic will be even more drastic, and it 
is hitting the EU during its ongoing crises. 
Beyond concrete projects, there are three 
principles that should inform Germany’s 
approach to its presidency. 
Exercising co-leadership – 
also beyond the presidency 
The German presidency can only succeed in 
this if it can broker compromises between its 
EU partners. But in view of the devastating 
effects of the pandemic, more can and will 
be expected of Germany as an EU heavy-
weight than just forging compromises and 
working through a predetermined agenda. 
Still, the presidency cannot be the sole driv-
ing force providing strong leadership in 
Europe. Instead, it must work together with 
newly elected EU leaders still working to 
consolidate their political authority. It would 
be of little help to the future development 
of the EU if Germany were to reinforce the 
role of the presidency at the expense of the 
institutional leadership of the European 
Council president, the Commission presi-
dent, and/or the High Representative. Ger-
many’s leadership responsibility will not 
end with its Council presidency. 
Priority must be given to crisis contain-
ment, to mitigating the immediate effects 
of the pandemic, bearing in mind that – 
without a vaccine and effective medication 
– a second wave of infections could cause 
even greater damage. Yet, it is equally im-
portant not to get lost in crisis manage-
ment. For therein lies the greatest oppor-
tunity and challenge: to heed the lessons 
of the pandemic and use them to revitalise 
a crisis-ridden EU. 
In this regard, the corona crisis has 
opened a window of opportunity as it 
potently demonstrates the unique added 
value that member states gain from Euro-
pean unification. In combating pandemics, 
a “prevention paradox” can be observed: 
Strict hygiene measures and restrictions 
concerning contact and mobility ensure 
containment, but their very success appears 
to undermine the rationale, and thus tends 
to render people more inclined to disregard 
cumbersome restrictions. The EU some-
times suffers from a similar “success trap”: 
If everyone assumes that the Union is fail-
safe, they can reduce their willingness to 
exercise national solidarity for the Euro-
pean common good. 
This was evident at the beginning of the 
pandemic, when national reflexes prevailed 
and borders were closed in an uncoordinated 
manner. However, the crisis quickly taught 
member states that going it alone is not a 
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viable option, meaning that only a collec-
tive European response was the way out. 
Unprecedented rescue and recovery pro-
grammes were mobilised both nationally 
and at the European level. Germany, too, 
initially alienated partners by imposing 
export restrictions, but then quickly showed 
practical solidarity (e.g. by supplying medi-
cal goods, admitting Covid-19 patients to 
German hospitals, and lifting said restric-
tions). 
One of the main tasks of the German 
presidency will be to ensure that solidarity 
and a joint economic recovery programme 
are achieved quickly. However, it is not 
only the result that counts, but also how 
an agreement is reached. For the fund is 
unique not only because of its size, but 
also because it is based on the collective as-
sumption of debt, which will be repaid in 
the long term from EU own resources. This 
would be a significant step towards fiscal 
integration, which the member states have 
so far been unwilling to take. 
What is more, the integrative push 
resulting from the pandemic crisis might 
also facilitate “package solutions”. A dead-
lock on individual issues can sometimes be 
overcome if these issues become part of a 
larger package: Achieving a compromise 
can be made easier if more items are on 
offer that enable cross-issue deals. Such a 
“grand package” deal could consist of the 
recovery fund, the MFF, the Green Deal’s 
Just Transition Fund, the rule of law, and 
migration issues. 
Seize the opportunity 
Secondly, Germany and Europe could make 
up for a previously missed opportunity. 
Between the French and German elections 
in 2017 and the European elections in 
2019, there was an opportunity to enact 
more far-reaching EU reforms. It was not 
seized upon – partly because Berlin 
remained too passive during this period. 
In addition to the joint fight against – 
and recovery from – the pandemic, two 
other factors now favour European inte-
gration. The first is the May 2020 ruling of 
the German Constitutional Court on the 
bond purchase programme of the European 
Central Bank (ECB). Its central message is 
that the ECB must not overstep its authority 
if it does not want to come into conflict 
with the German constitution. The ruling 
should encourage the German government 
to press ahead with the structural reform of 
the Eurozone in order to provide relief for 
the ECB and make the member states more 
accountable to each other. In the end this, 
would entail fewer ECB interventions and 
more fiscal union. 
Another integrative factor is the US. 
Under President Trump, transatlantic rela-
tions have deteriorated and will hardly 
improve if he is re-elected. But even under 
a President Joe Biden, there will be no going 
back to the time before Trump due to the 
country’s fragmentation, its demographic 
change, the devastations wrought by the 
pandemic, and the wounds Trump will 
leave behind. The US will demand more 
burden-sharing and ownership from Europe, 
which coincides with Europe’s interest in a 
more balanced transatlantic partnership. 
In addition, the US-China rivalry – Trump 
or no Trump – will not vanish, not least 
because of the high-handedness of the auto-
cratic Chinese leadership. Only a united 
Europe can prevent its member states from 
becoming pawns in the games of global 
powers. 
The corona pandemic, Brexit, the ECB 
ruling of the Constitutional Court, a bal-
anced transatlantic partnership, Europe’s 
self-assertion in the US-Chinese rivalry, and 
vis-à-vis an expansive China – they are all 
integration-promoting circumstances and 
factors that could advance a successful Ger-
man presidency. The planned launch of 
the Conference on the Future of Europe 
can also provide a long-term impetus for 
the progressive development of the EU. 
Promoting European solidarity 
and autonomy 
It is easier to enhance Europe’s popularity 
and exercise political leadership if one has 
a guiding idea of what Europe stands for 
SWP Comment 33 
June 2020 
8 
and how it should deliver for the benefit 
of its citizens. Such an idea could be an 
autonomous Europe that relies on mutual 
solidarity. Solidarity is a comprehensive 
principle based on reciprocity: Reciprocal 
political solidarity means that it can be ex-
pected when everyone does their national 
share for the common European good. 
Tangible solidarity implies more than fi-
nancial support for those who have suffered 
most from the pandemic; at its core it is 
about being loyal to the Union, that is, ad-
hering to the values, rules, and objectives 
as laid down in EU treaties. This includes 
respecting the EU as a community of 
democracy and rule of law. Furthermore, 
solidarity has an external dimension: a 
Europe that acts as a fair and generous 
partner to others. 
Autonomy does not mean self-suffi-
ciency, which is neither attainable nor 
desirable (see SWP Research Paper 4/2019). 
An autonomous Europe is a Europe whose 
collective power puts its member states on 
an equal footing with third parties, be they 
states or non-governmental actors such as 
America’s Google and Amazon or Chinese 
companies such as Baidu and Alibaba. The 
pandemic has revealed how fragile supply 
chains and how harmful excessive depend-
encies can be. A long-term challenge trans-
cending the German presidency will be to 
make Europe more autonomous through 
measured de-globalisation, not only with 
regard to medicines and protective clothing, 
but also with regard to digital infrastruc-
ture, energy, and key technologies. Such 
a Europe can and must act as a self-deter-
mined regional and global player. Only 
an autonomous Europe can enter into 
symmetrical interdependencies of its own 
choosing. Championing an autonomous 
Europe based on solidarity is worth all 
the efforts of the German presidency. 
Ambassador (ret.) Dr Eckhard Lübkemeier is a Visiting Fellow in the EU / Europe Division at SWP. 
Dr Nicolai von Ondarza is Deputy Head of the EU / Europe Division at SWP. 
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